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LEGAL PATIENCY – 
DEVELOPING A NEW 




All animals with non-borderline sentience are deserving of certain legal considerations 
independent of their use and relationship to human beings. That is, all sentient beings 
should have some rights. Given the current organization of the U.S. legal system which 
divides all entities into property or persons, it is not surprising that animals are relegated 
to property status. I put forth a proposal to fix this whose central suggestion is that we 
create a third legal designation, legal patient, into which all non-person sentient animals 
(those which do not properly belong in either current category) would fit. These animals 
would receive certain limited rights, which would be implemented through legal 
structures already in place, such as those used in providing legal advocacy for children. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Legally and socially, we are of two minds about which forms of nonhuman animal 
treatment are acceptable. We tend to think that it is wrong to harm certain animals such 
as mammals, but only if these are animals with whom we have a special relationship (i.e. 
pets). We protect many animals via anti-cruelty laws, but only insofar as it does not 
disrupt human industry (i.e. factory farming, etc.). We simultaneously view domesticated 
nonhuman animals as vulnerable beings in need of protection and as exploitable 
resources.  
The way the American Legal system is set up does not help matters. Within 
our system, domesticated animals only have two options for categorization: persons or 
property. Despite current attempts1 no nonhuman animals in the U.S. have thus far been 
 
1 Steven Wise is perhaps the most well-known animal lawyer, and he represents a group of lawyers who are 
trying to get certain animals (chimpanzees, elephants) recognized as legal persons. See, for example, Wise, 
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granted personhood, and thus they are all still property. Despite the fact that certain 
animals probably do merit consideration as persons, most certainly do not. Were we to 
include all of the most intelligent animals species, however so defined, into personhood, 
we would still be left with thousands of species of animals who are sentient2, but fall short 
of the personhood threshold. What of them? Surely they are more than property. 
To be fair, there are protections for many (though not most) domesticated 
sentient animals in the form of anti-cruelty legislation, but these do not extend to the 
realm of civil law, and therefore do not provide those animals with civil rights.  They need 
civil rights to be protected in the way they deserve. This paper will lay out a framework 
that is capable of remedying the issue, a framework that is both morally sensible and 
practically feasible. Its main component is that we need a new, third category, which I call 
Legal Patiency so that sentient, nonperson animals may be definitively separated from 
persons and property alike. 
2 WHICH RIGHTS DO SENTIENT NONHUMANS 
DESERVE? 
In a sense, it is helpful to start from scratch in considering rights for sentient 
nonhumans.3 If they deserve any rights, it would seem that a good place to begin is the 
most basic rights that persons enjoy. Some basic rights, such as freedom of religion, are 
probably not applicable to any nonhuman animals. But others certainly are. There are two 
main categories of such rights that sentient animals need. The first is freedom from 
unjustified bodily harm or injury, and the second is the right to sue directly for any harm 
or injury done to them. The latter would take the form of the ability to bring a civil case 
to court and sue for damages. These two kinds of right are a good foundation because they 
are prerequisites for many other rights, but also have a lot of room for interpretation and 
development. 
The right against bodily harm, i.e. the right to bodily integrity is one of the 
most basic rights a sentient being can have. Although this is not a specific right guaranteed 
by the U.S. Constitution, the so-called right to privacy is often interpreted as including 
bodily integrity and therefore bodily harm. This is found in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Bill of Rights, and reads as follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
 
Steven. (2013). Nonhuman Rights to Personhood. Pace Environmental Law Review, 30(3): 1278-1290. 
Thus far he has not succeeded. 
2 Although there is disagreement over the bounds of sentience, it clearly extends to mammals and birds, if 
not all vertebrates or even beyond. There is a huge literature on this topic. Here is one good place to start: 
Proctor, Helen S., Carder, Gemma, & Cornish, Amelia R. (2013). Searching for Animal Sentience: A 
Systematic Review of the Scientific Literature. Animals (Basel).  3(3): 882–906.  
3 The present discussion will center on sentient nonhuman animals, but most if not all of what is said here 
may be applied to sentient nonpersons more generally, whomever that category turns out to include. 
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deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.  
Currently, this right has only been applied to born human beings. The right to bodily 
integrity is defined as, “the right of each human being, including children, to autonomy 
and self-determination over their own body. It considers an unconsented physical 
intrusion as a human rights violation.” (CRIN 2017) This principle is often used in 
reference to torture and inhumane treatment. The Eighth Amendment of the United 
States prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments” which are defined as those that are one 
or more of 1. Degrading to human dignity, 2. Inflicted arbitrarily, 3. Societally rejected, 
and 4. Patently unnecessary. These conditions were established by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Justice William Brennan’s opinion in 1972, which also said that no state should 
pass a law obviously violating any one of these. (Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238) A 
similar protection is included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was 
adopted by the UN in 1948. It is important to note that the right to bodily integrity is not 
considered inalienable, and so it is not absolute. For instance, the death penalty is allowed 
by all the documents just mentioned. Whatever rights we decide sentient animals must 
have, they will likely turn out to be alienable as well with certain circumstances 
warranting exceptions to otherwise universal claims. 
Given this understanding, it does not seem too complicated a task to apply 
the standards of freedom from bodily harm to nonhuman animal care and to be clear on 
when they are violated. The more complicated issue would likely be to identify those 
situations in which violations should be permitted.4 For now, it will be enough to argue 
that SNP’s do in fact need this right. If one of the bases for the right to bodily integrity is 
autonomy and self-determination, than it seems that many other animals have this right 
as well. Thanks in part to Steven Wise, arguably America’s most famous animal lawyer, 
there is a fairly large literature supporting the claim that many other animals do have 
these traits.5 If he is right, then the basis for human rights also supports rights for at least 
some nonhumans.  
So let us move on to the second type of right: the right to sue and be made 
whole. In case any legal patients’ rights were violated, that animal should be able to seek 
damages for the harm done to them. As it currently stands in criminal animal abuse cases, 
the state or country is the party considered wronged, while in civil cases, the animal’s 
owner is the injured party. The animal themselves is not considered the injured party in 
either case, which is unjust. When caused harm that violates their bodily integrity, 
sentient nonpersons should have the right to seek damages by suing in civil court in order 
for them to be able to take action against and receive benefits from the party that caused 
them suffering or injury. In legal jargon, this process is called “making whole.” To take 
this term literally would be a mistake, for in most instances it is not possible to undo the 
damage caused to a victim. Rather, we can think of “making whole” as receiving 
 
4 Some instances would be clear, as in cases of harming an animal in self-defense. Others may be less clear, 
such as if and when research interests would be important enough that sentient animals’ rights may be 
overridden. 
5 See his books, Rattling the Cage (2000); Drawing the Line (2003). It is also worth noting that the word 
“autonomy” is not always used to mean the same thing. For an overview of various uses, see Christman 
(2018). 
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reparations or compensation for a loss sustained. It is most common for these reparations 
to be monetary in nature, though other types are possible.  
This right to sue for damages is considered a fundamental human right in the 
U.S. In 1983, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. 
NLRB made the point that “the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First 
Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances.” In another case 
in 2002, Sandra Day O’Connor noted that the right to sue in court was a form of petition, 
and said, “We have recognized this right to petition as one of the most precious of the 
liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.” (BE&K Construction Co. v. National Labor 
Relations Board) Civil cases are there to determine whether the defendant is liable for the 
plaintiff's injuries, and if so, to compensate the victim for the harm done to her or him. 
These cases can be brought by, or on behalf of, any legal person.6 
By definition, a sentient nonperson can be harmed. However, they are not 
capable (as far as we know) of filing a suit on their own behalf. Were those animals given 
the right to sue, the court would have to allow a third party to represent the animal in 
court. One of the most frequently stated reasons that courts have denied this right to 
animals in the past is the slippery slope argument. Some judges worry that if the door is 
opened to animals suing as plaintiffs that the courts will be overwhelmed with such cases. 
Another version of this slippery slope argument is that once we allow the most intelligent 
(i.e. most human) animals to sue, what’s to say that we will be unable to draw a line, and 
suddenly every half-squashed earthworm will be allowed to have its day in court. In Lock 
v. Falkenstein, a 1963 case regarding the legality of cockfighting, the judge concluded: 
“Society could not long tolerate a system of laws which might drag to the criminal bar 
every lady who might impale a butterfly, or every man who might drown a litter of 
kittens.” (Lock v. Falkenstein 1963) Despite the remark about kittens, there is a real 
concern here: it may turn out that many more animals are deserving of protection than 
can be reasonably protected.  
The first concern is addressed in section V below. The second, that there is 
nowhere to draw the line, is false; the line I am suggesting is sentience. Now, of course, 
there is debate about what counts as sentience (Nay & Fetherstonhaugh 2012) and about 
whether sentience is a threshold trait or exists on a continuum (as it appears that most 
abilities do). (Hadley 2015) Surely these questions require a fair amount of attention. But 
unanswered questions are no justification for perpetuating an injustice. 
3 WHY THESE RIGHTS REQUIRE A NEW LEGAL 
CATEGORY 
It may at first appear that we can give animals rights within the category of property. 
Furthermore, it may seem to us that animals already possess certain rights. In a sense, 
that’s true. Animal cruelty laws, which exist only in criminal law, may be seen as affording 
to those animals the right not to be treated in certain ways. But I wish to question this 
interpretation. I will show that 1. Animal cruelty laws are not animal rights, that is, they 
 
6 There is a further related issue, legal standing, into which I will not delve.  
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are not rights belonging to the animal him or herself, 7  and 2. There is nothing 
approximating animal rights in civil law. To make this case, we have to answer two 
questions: What does it mean to have a right? What is the purpose of a right?  
There is an entire field of legal theory devoted to such questions which I’ll not 
enter into. 8  Instead I will use the widely accepted Hohlefdian framework for 
understanding what rights are and what they entail. Hohfeld divided rights into four 
categories: claims, privileges, powers, and immunities. (Wenar 2015) The kind of rights 
we are interested in is claim-rights. To have this kind of right means that you have a claim 
on another to act or not act in a certain way. For instance, I have a claim on you not to 
assault me without justification. The correlative of a claim is a duty. My claim on you 
indicates that you have a duty toward me, in this case, the duty to not assault me without 
justification.  
Given this rubric, it may appear as if anti-cruelty laws can be understood as 
claims-rights that animals have against legal persons, with the correlative duty of persons 
not to engage in cruel behavior toward those animals. But here is where the distinction 
lies: In the above example about assault, I have a claim against you. What that means is, 
regardless of any criminal proceedings that may take place, I can seek restoration for 
myself through the civil system. In the case of animal cruelty laws, the entity that is 
acknowledged as having been wronged is either 1. (In criminal cases) the American 
people/government (federal, state, municipal) which enacted the law, and/or 2. (In Civil 
cases) the person who owns the harmed animal. In other words, the government or person 
has the claim against certain types of animal harm. The animal itself does not have a 
claim, and therefore has no right.  
To be protected against some form of action means that others are restricted 
in certain ways. For example, the illegality of selling a member of an endangered species 
imposes a restriction on the would-be purveyor, and if that person violates the law, he or 
she is held responsible. What that protection does not entail is the right of the animal not 
to be sold. A right is a just or legal claim on something or on some action. If the animal 
were to have a right, it would be the animal who would have been wronged (not the 
government), and the animal (with the help of a human advocate) who would be able to 
bring a claim to court.  
Mere protection is something that is afforded to all property. My stereo is 
protected by law. Any and all property is protected in the sense that if it were to be unduly 
taken from me, broken, or otherwise damaged, I would be entitled to recompense. In this 
case, it is very clear that being protected does not confer rights. The stereo has no right 
not to be stolen or broken, even though it is the stereo which is protected. It is my right 
not to have my property messed with from which the stereo’s protection derives. One may 
point out that in my example it is not technically the stereo that is being protected under 
the law, but rather it is I who am being protected from having my property damaged. 
Therefore, one might say that anti- cruelty laws, in specifically protecting animals, are 
really conferring rights on them. I’m willing to acknowledge that it may seem like animals 
 
7 On my understanding, no criminal violations are violations of non-governmental persons because they are 
all crimes against the government.  
8 For discussions on the nature of rights, see, for example, Feinberg (1970), Hohfeld (1919), and Walen 
(2019). For discussions on the function(s) of rights see, for example, Hart (1982), Raz (1986), and 
McCormick (1977). 
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already do possess some rights (though rather paltry ones) in the realm of criminal law. 
However, “criminal rights” is not an actual category, since under these laws it is really the 
government that is being protected. The only rights individuals have are in the civil realm. 
And there is no analogous law in civil court that directly protects animals.  
Animals do not have legal claims, because only persons do. All entities 
considered property have no recourse under civil law. They cannot seek damages and they 
have no legal voice. Thus, when an animal is abused by its owner, there is, somewhat 
absurdly, no crime against the animal. Therefore, even if the abuser is found guilty, the 
animal is not guaranteed to receive the benefit from any fines (civil or criminal) that the 
abuser is required to pay. This is an essential difference between causing damage to a 
person and to a nonperson; the former can receive the damages, and can decide how to 
spend them, while the nonperson is at the mercy of the suing party. Some of the money 
may be used to help the animal, or it may not be. That is to say, legal protection does not 
entail legal rights.  
4 DAVID FAVRE’S EQUITABLE SELF-OWNERSHIP & 
FERNANDEZ’S QUASI-PERSON/QUASI PROPERTY 
There are several scholars who are working on this problem. They have made various 
suggestions including everything from granting all sentient animals personhood status to 
making minor improvements to animal protection laws. It seems clear that the views on 
either extreme will not be able to solve the problem. In this section, we will take a closer 
look at two solutions which may at first appear to make substantial revisions to animals’ 
legal status, but which ultimately fail to address the underlying issue— the problematic 
nature of a two-tier legal system. The person who has come the closest to providing a 
solution to this discrepancy is, in this author’s opinion, David Favre. Although his 
proposal is not entirely satisfying in terms of the points made in the previous section, if 
an argument could be made that sentient animals could remain property and be treated 
fairly, Favre makes it.  
Favre (2010) states that his goal is make the relationship of an owner to her 
cat less like that of an owner to a rock and more like that of a parent to a child, that is, a 
custodial relationship. He asks, “Can there be created a new property status that would 
allow animals to have rights?” (p. 12) He discussed, as I have done, the difference between 
criminal and civil rights, correctly saying that such rights “must be actionable, enforceable 
by the animal him or herself. The key limitation of the present right of animals... is that... 
if the state decides not to act in a particular case, then the harmed animal is without 
remedy.” (p. 16)  
He notes that our legal system allows a property owner to divide the title over 
property into two: the legal title and the equitable title. This is a tool commonly used when 
the owner of property is not the one who is in control of it. An example of when this might 
happen is when an estate is bequeathed to a child who is incapable of maintaining it. In 
this case, while the child maintains the equitable title to the estate, someone else is given 
the legal title in order to make decisions about the estate on behalf of the child, and in his 
or her best interest.  
Since animals are a kind of property, one could split up the elements of their 
title in the same way. According to Favre, this would provide a framework for allocating 
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more rights to some animals. An owner of an animal could transfer the equitable title of 
the animal to the animal his or herself. The human would maintain the legal title, 
essentially creating in the human a legal obligation to act in the animal’s best interest, i.e. 
making the human a guardian.  
On the surface, this suggestion appears to address the crux of the problem. 
But this view has several difficulties, ranging from moderate to serious. One moderate 
problem is that Favre’s view says nothing about what qualities make an animal able to 
possess equitable self-ownership. To the contrary, he asserts that such a system would 
apply to any living thing, saying, “unless a human has an affirmatively asserted lawful 
dominion and control so as to obtain title to a living entity, then a living entity will be 
considered to have self-ownership” (p. 236) It is not entirely clear whether he is using 
imprecise language here or making a rather strong claim that would likely turn most 
people off. Either way, I consider this is a moderate problem because it is easily fixed by 
specifying the domain over which such a paradigm would range.  
The biggest problem with Favre’s view, however, is that it further confuses 
the categories of personhood and property rather than clarifying them. Property, by 
definition, does not have rights. To have rights in today’s legal system is to be a legal 
person. All persons have rights, and all rights-holders are persons. On one hand, he 
acknowledges that animals would still be property— after all, the title of his paper on the 
topic is “A New Property Status for Animals.” On the other hand, he seems to consider 
those animals persons as well, saying, “As entities with legally recognized interests, self-
owned animals have sufficient status as juristic persons so as to be able to hold equitable 
interest in other property.” (p. 243, emphasis added) For Favre, certain animals would be 
both property and persons. But this is precisely the problem we already have! If we were 
to redefine property to allow some sub-categories to have rights, I’m not sure why, in this 
hypothetical world, we couldn’t put humans into the property category as well, simply as 
a class of property with more rights than other classes. That is, if we are going to eliminate 
the fundamental distinction between those property and personhood, why not just 
eliminate personhood in toto? His solution seems to eliminate the only relevant 
distinction we have in the legal system now. 
Angela Fernandez specifically addresses this problem. In her 2018 paper 
“Not Quite Property, Not Quite Persons” Fernandez agrees that the current dichotomous 
thinking in terms of personhood versus property status is untenable. She believes that 
nonhuman animals are not merely property, and more importantly, that they need to have 
an expanded set of rights. With that in mind, she sets out to develop a category “quasi-
person/quasi-property” which she thinks will give sufficient protection to nonhuman 
animals without making too many waves in the sea of public opinion. This category would 
allow animals to retain their property status while also having more rights.  
She says that in countries where animals have been recognized as having a 
legal status beyond property (such as “person,” “being,” etc.) this hasn’t necessarily led to 
reforms in their day-to-day treatment.9 She therefore argues that giving them these new 
 
9 Currently, there are 32 countries that recognize animal sentience. The Austrian Animal Welfare Act 2004 
suggests that the protection of the wellbeing of animals should be held to a value that is equal to 
humankind. The Swiss Animal Welfare Act of 2005 protects the welfare and dignity of animals. Several 
countries, such a Slovakia, have updated their laws to call animals “beings” instead of “things.” None of 
these amount to rights for animals, however, since animals are still considered property in each case. (ABA 
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“titles” is misleading, and we should continue calling them quasi-property until their 
handling truly changes. Furthermore, since there are, in fact, restrictions with what a 
person can do with certain kinds of property, she concludes that property status “is not 
necessarily inconsistent with non-abuse and the status certainly does not necessarily 
involve or permit abuse.” (42) In other words, personhood status is not necessarily good 
and property status is not necessarily bad.  
However, she does seem to acknowledge that property status is bad. She says:  
Is property the problem? Yes and no. It is a problem and, indeed, classifying 
animals as property has facilitated their instrumental use and treatment as 
objects (rather than subjects) tremendously. However, beyond classification, 
the bigger problem is the social attitude that normalizes nonhuman animal 
use (and abuse)… De-classifying nonhuman animals as property will not in-
and-of-itself solve those problems. (63) 
This is a rather odd thing to say.  She agrees that property status has historically allowed 
animals to be abused and exploited, and she agrees that humans have an attitude toward 
animals that is problematic, but then concludes that these two things are not related. They 
are related; as she herself acknowledges later on, the language we use to talk about 
something alters how we think about it. David Nibert, in his book Animal Rights, Human 
Rights discusses the importance of social and political structures in shaping a culture’s 
system of values. In particular, he argues that prejudice is not the cause of these 
structures, but becomes widespread because of them. Eventually, such views become 
“naturalized,” so commonplace as to be an invisible premise in our daily lives and actions. 
(2002) So it is very much the case that animals’ status as property affects the seriousness 
with which we treat laws protecting them. 
Furthermore, no one has ever claimed (to my knowledge) that simply 
changing animals’ legal status would fix all the unfortunate aspects of their treatment. 
Naturally, there would need to be specifications in both law and policy by lawmakers and 
government agencies, methods by which those laws and policies would be enforced, a 
judicial system which was able and willing to prosecute such violations, and so on. That 
was the case when children were first considered persons, and that would be the case were 
any nonhuman animals to get a new designation. Is property the problem? Yes and yes.  
The other main issue with Fernandez’s suggestion is that her concern appears 
to be creating a category which accurately and uncontroversially describes how 
nonhuman animals are seen by the courts, the legislature, and the general public. Her 
category is aimed at identifying how people currently think about animals, not how they 
 
2020; Pallotta 2018) In some cases, such as in Quebec, the recognition of animals as sentient beings changes 
their legal status such that they are not in the same category as inanimate objects. However, in none of these 
cases do animals gain actual civil rights.  (The Canadian Press 2015) a similar upgrade has occurred in 
Brussels, where animals previously considered objects have been recognized as “living being[s] endowed 
with sensitivity, interests of [their] own and dignity, that benefits from special protection.” (Vincent 2018) 
Even in these countries, however, animals have not been accorded actual rights. 
Additionally, there have been a few isolated examples of nonhuman animals being granted personhood 
status. For example, in Argentina a captive chimpanzee named Cecilia was granted “nonhuman personhood 
status.” (Choplin 2016) These are certainly positive changes, but 1. they have so far only helped a few 
individual animals, and 2. There are many sentient animals who will never be considered persons. 
GLOBAL JOURNAL OF ANIMAL LAW 
9 
should think about animals nor what animals actually are. She says, “quasi-property 
would resonate with how most people think about nonhuman animals…our language 
should not get too ahead of where most people are in terms of their attitudes towards 
nonhuman animals.” (47) This is descriptive instead of prescriptive. Moreover, Fernandez 
herself admits that her own solution is not ideal saying, “‘[Q]uasi’… accepts an imperfect 
state of existence, working with it. It is not pure but it might be good enough.” (75) 
Perhaps there’s a place in the world for such a theory, but it certainly will not move the 
world forward or significantly improve the state of animal treatment.  
Insofar as practicality must be a consideration in moral theorizing, it does 
seem unwise to try and get all sentient animals personhood status. Unfortunately, 
Fernandez feels beholden to the very dichotomous system that she had previously 
denigrated. She says, “given that both of these categories are so central to legal thinking, 
this paper argues that we should move towards and into both of those categories, using 
them creatively and expansively rather than trying to avoid or supersede them.” (3) Why? 
There is no reason that we should dig further into the quagmire of trying to fit round pegs 
into square holes. Either the peg or hole or both will get damaged in the process. The truth 
is that these two categories have always been and always will be insufficient to properly 
describe and protect the kinds of beings that exist in this world. And Fernandez admits 
this, saying “The goal would be for nonhuman animals to be treated as if they are persons, 
for the purposes of respecting the rights they have, which are appropriate to their 
situation; and as if they are not merely property, in the sense of having their own existence 
and interests.” (76) But her suggestion would not accomplish this.  
The myriad suggestions available within the literature are insufficient, many 
of them sharing the same pitfalls as the two enumerated above. It seems clear that the 
two-category system is itself at least partly to blame for the sorry state of animal rights. 
Since most humans are unwilling to include other species within personhood, most 
sentient animals are not persons anyway, and property cannot have civil rights, these 
beings are stuck- legal nomads with no place to call home. Instead of endlessly trying to 
finagle a solution within the existing, problematic system, let us make clean break from 
property and personhood and create a new category which is precisely designed to 
accommodate those beings which are neither. We would thus avoid the issue of grouping 
other animals in with humans while simultaneously releasing sentient animals from the 
danger of being seen as mere “things.” 
5 EXISTING LEGAL STRUCTURES FOR HUMAN 
INCOMPETENTS 
It is important to make clear that the present proposal is not that human rights be applied 
to other animals. Rather, animal rights should be applied to animals. In other words, all 
sentient beings deserve some rights by the mere fact of their sentience. Certainly some of 
those will overlap with human rights, but all that means is that those are more accurately 
conceived of as sentient-being rights. Given that a new category may be seen by some as 
a drastic suggestion, it would be preferable to make use of existing legal structure as much 
as possible. As it turns out, there is already a group for whom we have developed a 
structure that can be applied to sentient nonhumans: legally incompetent humans. Civil 
law requires legal competency to enter a contract, sign a will, or make other types of 
GLOBAL JOURNAL OF ANIMAL LAW 
10 
binding legal commitments. (Barnett 1986) Humans may be deemed incompetent for 
many reasons, but two of the most common ones are age and mental impairment.10 I will 
focus on the former for the majority of this section, and discuss how the current model 
that is in place for such humans would work for sentient non-humans as well. 
Child protection laws were not always as robust as they are today. In fact, for 
a long time children were considered the property of their parents, and, as such, the latter 
were legally allowed to do what they wanted with them. (Wagman et al. 2010) Children 
could be given, transferred, or bequeathed by their parents. They were treated as a 
commodity in support of the parents’ rights.11 (Maillard 2012) Up until the late 1800s, 
when the NY Society for the Prevention of Cruetly to Children was founded, there was 
only occasional intervention in cruel treatment of children. But even as the tide slowly 
shifted toward a realization that “if children are to be protected from neglect the service 
must be performed by public agencies,” (Falconer 1935) it wasn’t until the 1980’s that 
children were actually given legal representation in court. (Wagman et al. 2010)  
Even today, in child custody cases, the courts more often reference the child’s 
interests than the child’s rights.12 But there are several important ways in which children 
do have rights. In the criminal realm, children are entitled to a safe environment, good 
nutrition, healthcare, and education. Parents do have a pretty broad right to raise their 
children as they see fit, but if a parent is not meeting the child’s basic needs, the state can 
remove the child. Minors also have rights under the U.S. Constitution; they have the right 
to equal protection and are also entitled to due process. As children age and become more 
mature, they accrue other rights, such as a limited right to be free from government 
restrictions on speech and a right to work. Despite all these guarantees, there are some 
rights that minors do not have. Children are not allowed to vote, consent to medical 
treatment, sue or be sued, or enter into certain types of contracts, at least not without a 
legal guardian acting on their behalf. (Find Law 2019d) We will return to the issue of suing 
shortly. 
Minors are not only protected by criminal law, but also by civil law. There are 
two ways that children are represented in court, by a court appointed attorney (the 
specific title varies by state) and/or by a guardian ad litem (GAL). A lawyer can be hired 
to represent the child her or himself. In divorce and custody cases the court may appoint 
a lawyer for the child. If the court does not think a lawyer is necessary, a parent or 
guardian has the option to hire one. However, the court always appoints a lawyer in 
juvenile court cases involving abuse, neglect, or delinquency. (CT Law Help) When a 
lawyer is hired to represent a child, she or he must be hired by an adult who has been put 
in charge of the child’s care in one way or another. 
 
10 Some states expand the realm of incompetent persons to include fetuses at certain developmental stages. 
(Roden 2010) 
11 Two of the seminal cases that reinforced those principles were Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390, 400 
(1923) which recognized the authority of parents to make basic choices for their children, and Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510 (1925) which struck down an Oregon statute requiring children to attend 
public school.  
12 There is also an interesting question about the “peculiar triangle of rights” between a parent, child, and 
the state, and how the state approaches apparent conflicts between those parties. See Brumley, Alison M. 
(1991) "Parental Control of a Minor's Right to Sue in Federal Court," University of Chicago Law Review: 
Vol. 58 : Iss. 1 , Article 8. 
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While the court appointed attorney represents the child’s legal interests and 
supports the child’s best interests, a GAL represents only the latter. The GAL is a person 
the court appoints to investigate what solutions would be in the “best interests of a child.” 
While the specific laws vary by state, there are some commonalities nation-wide. Here is 
an example from Maine of the reasons for which a GAL may be appointed: 
The court may appoint a guardian ad litem when the court has reason for 
special concern as to the welfare of a minor child. In determining whether an 
appointment must be made, the court shall consider: 
A. The wishes of the parties…  
B. The age of the child… 
C. The nature of the proceeding, including the contentiousness of the 
hearing…  
D. The financial resources of the parties…  
E. The extent to which a guardian ad litem may assist in providing 
information concerning the best interest of the child…  
F. Whether the family has experienced a history of domestic abuse… 
G. Abuse of the child by one of the parties… and  
H. Other factors the court determines relevant. (Maine Title 19-A, 3.51) 
This is a pretty loose set of requirements, most notably with the last consideration of 
“other factors”.  
The GAL can be a lawyer or certain types of mental health professional. The 
court can ask the GAL to look into the child’s overall situation and make 
recommendations about things like parental rights. But usually, the court will ask the GAL 
to look into specific issues like mental health or medical records of the parents or child, 
or a parent’s current ability to make rational decisions about a child’s care. This is called 
a “limited-purpose appointment” and will usually name particular people the GAL needs 
to talk to. The Court may also order the GAL to provide an oral or written report. The law 
requires parents or guardians to cooperate with the GAL and follow all of their reasonable 
requests. (Pine Tree Legal Assistance) Interestingly, the GAL is required to make the 
wishes of the child known to the court if the child has expressed any, even if those wishes 
do not align with the GAL recommendations.  
The other important role that the GAL has is that she or he (or the court-
appointed attorney) can sue on the child’s behalf if unrelated to the case. In that way, 
there is someone looking out not only for the child’s interests, but for the child’s rights.13 
A parent or guardian can also sue on the child’s behalf. These three individuals, the 
parent, guardian, and guardian ad litem have prudential (court-given) standing to sue on 
behalf of a third party because while older children may be able to file a suit for themselves 
in certain circumstances, children generally are not presumed to be able to sue on their 
own behalf.  
 
13 One interesting civil right that certain minors have is emancipation. In cases where a child both desires 
and deserves to be free from the control of his or her parents, the child can sue. Sometimes this is referred 
to as divorce. In either case, it involves the termination of parental rights and means the minor is now 
treated as a self-dependent adult. This sort of framework may apply to certain nonhuman animals, but I 
won’t argue that point here. 
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There are, of course, some disanalogies between human children and SNP’s. 
For one, SNP’s will never graduate to adulthood and be able to take control of their own 
legal battles. Most of them will never be able to express themselves in English to the court 
or take the witness stand. But that is also true of some humans with severe mental 
disabilities whom we nevertheless believe have the right to an attorney and to have 
someone looking out for their best interests. In cases where a person has a mental 
incapacity such that she can no longer understand enough to manage her own affairs or 
make important decisions about her life, a guardianship is necessary. (The Elder Law 
Clinic) In addition to the guardian, an incompetent person may also have a guardian ad 
litem and a court appointed attorney, just as a minor would. A person is not deprived of 
their right to sue merely due to incompetence. 
When discussing this proposal with lawyers, they often bring up the concern 
that both lawyers and courts are already swamped with human cases. There are two ways 
to answer this concern. The first is moral: Something being difficult is not a sufficient 
reason to not do it. However, understanding that there are real logistical concerns, there 
is a second answer: It would not necessarily lead to a prohibitive increase on the workload. 
To understand why this is so, we can look Desmond’s Law, which was passed in CT in 
2016. Desmond’s Law is a law that allows legal advocates to testify on behalf of cats and 
dogs in cruelty and neglect cases. Advocates can be appointed by a judge or requested by 
prosecutors or defense attorneys. These advocates are pro-bono attorneys or law 
students, who are enabled by the court to gather information, conduct research, and make 
recommendations to the court. Because they are volunteers, this process places no 
additional work on private or public prosecutors. (Pallotta 2017)  
These advocates play a role similar to the guardian ad litem role discussed 
above, but they are not formally recognized as such because the dogs and cats do not have 
a status that would allow them legal guardians. Even so, this program has so far yielded 
many successes. In addition to having the animals’ interests represented in court, law 
students have been able to gain valuable experience in the courtroom. Were the U.S. to 
enact a law allowing sentient nonpersons to sue in civil courts, the program could be 
begun under this framework making use of the 160 Law schools already have animal law 
classes and 195 law schools that have chapters of the Animal Legal Defense Fund. 
6 INCORPORATING SNP’S INTO THE EXISTING 
STRUCTURE 
Were sentient nonhumans to be given the basic rights discussed earlier in this chapter, 
they could be treated in much the same way as human incompetents, and this method of 
representation could be extended to them. Once it has been determined that an animal 
has experienced an actionable harm at the hands of a human, the animal’s guardian (a.k.a. 
owner) or other interested party would file suit on the animal’s behalf. This is the part 
where they get civil rights, because we could say here that an animal was suing for 
damages. If the guardian is not the person filing suit (possibly because the owner was the 
one who inflicted the harm) the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the 
animals’ interests in court. Just as with minors, the GAL would have the authority to 
examine the animal’s and relevant humans’ medical, veterinary, and mental health 
records, where appropriate. The court would also appoint an attorney (unless the animal’s 
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guardian hired one) who would legally represent the animal in the court case. Both the 
GAL and the attorney would treat the animal as their client, seeking only that which was 
in the animal’s legal and/or best interests. Importantly, just as with minors, these two 
individuals are in no way beholden to the animal’s guardian, so that there is no conflict of 
interest.14 
Now what happens if the animal wins? The most common type of damages 
awarded in tort cases is monetary damages. The court would determine what amount may 
be awarded to the animal in order to make her or him whole. For instance, the court could 
consider what kinds of care the animal would need to regain health moving forward, and 
what those would cost. In the same way that a guardian or GAL would be responsible for 
taking care of their charge’s property in the case of a human incompetent, the animal’s 
guardian or GAL would be responsible for seeing to the animal’s care. The fact that the 
money would “belong” to the animal is not a problem, as animals can already be the 
beneficiaries of trusts. (Dickinson 2017). The guardian would only have to follow the 
court’s orders and the animal’s best interest in dispensing the money.  
Let us now consider an example of this might play out in a likely situation.  
Say a man was fighting his dogs. First, someone would have to lodge a complaint with the 
court. Who is allowed to do this varies considerably by state. It would then be up to the 
court to decide whether the case has merit. If it does, then the case would go to court, and 
the court would assign a GAL and attorney for the dog, who would sue the owner on the 
dog’s behalf. In this hypothetical scenario, let’s say that the dog had suffered a broken leg 
and lacerated face due to the fights he was forced to take part in by the owner. The GAL 
would be directed by the court to look into the mental and criminal history of the owner 
and the veterinary records for the dog. She might also be asked to speak with relevant 
parties, such as the owner and other people who have interacted with the dog regularly 
including neighbors, etc. The GAL would make this material available to the lawyer and 
the court, and the lawyer would argue the case with the dog as his client. If the owner were 
found guilty then the court might determine that the way to make the dog whole would 
be to provide him with veterinary treatment for his injuries and to find him a suitable 
home. The court would fine the owner in direct proportion to the cost of these restitutions. 
The money would be held in escrow until the GAL used the money, on the dog’s behalf, 
and in compliance with the court’s order. The dog would receive the treatment he needs 
and, legally speaking, would be made whole. 
Recall that the issue with the current system is that animals are not 
themselves the beneficiaries of damages received for harms done to them. If an owner 
sues another human because of harm this human caused to the pet, the owner is the one 
who gets that money. The owner can then use the money in any way that she sees fit, to 
benefit the injured pet or not. This only acknowledges that the owner was wronged; it 
does nothing to recognize that the pet was harmed and is himself deserving of restitution. 
Furthermore, nothing suggested here would require an overhaul of our legal system. As 
we have seen, this type of system is already in place and well-trodden in regards to so-
 
14 While I’m focusing here on individual suits, this method could presumably be applied to class action suits 
where the care of a group of animals deviates from accepted standards, such as in puppy mills, factory 
farms, etc.  
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called incompetent humans. Rather, we should include sentient nonhumans under the 
existing system. Such treatment is entirely consistent with their lacking full personhood 
and it would make clear that sentient nonhumans are sentient beings who can be harmed, 
and deserve restitution for certain of those harms.  
7 CONCLUSION 
When we look at the U. S. legal system, we can clearly see that the law is trailing behind 
shifting public opinion and the growing knowledge we have of animal minds. The law still 
treats animals, in most cases, as no more than inanimate objects to be protected in order 
to secure the property owner’s rights. This is severely misguided. On the other hand, we 
can also see that the many attempts of getting nonhuman animals recognized as legal 
persons have failed, and, in fact, do not appear close to succeeding. So what can be done? 
We can recognize and respect sentient animals for who they are by creating a third 
category, legal patiency, aimed at accommodating such beings.  
There are some potential weaknesses to this proposal, however, it also has 
several important strengths. It is a strength to not force humans to include other animals 
in the same category as themselves, if not for moral reasons, then at least for practical 
ones. It is a strength not to have sentient beings in the same category as toasters. It is a 
strength to be able to give those animals actual civil rights, so that they cannot be 
wantonly abused and exploited. Finally, it is a strength not to muddle the two categories 
we already have by forcing sentient animals into one or the other where most of them do 
not belong. The legal system was not created with nonhuman animals in mind; but it 
doesn’t have to stay that way. With an increasing awareness of who and what animals are, 
we cannot in good conscience delay meaningful legal reform any longer. It is time for the 
law to catch up.  
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